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ABSTRACT 
Atrium buildings are now becoming a common feature in New Zealand with this new 
\ 
structural form being applied to hotels, office blocks and hospitals. Being a new form of 
structure, there has been little study or experience of how these buildings perform in the 
event of fire. 
In an effort to investigate just how safe atrium buildings are, this report will outline problems 
specifically associated with atria. The fire prot~ction and safety systems employed which can 
most effectively be used to protect property and save lives. By the use of case studies, 
typical fire control measures installed in atrium buildings are described, with a report on how 
these were installed in the Pan Pacific Hotel, Auckland, together with a brief description of 
recent incidents of atrium building fires. 
It should be made clear, how recent studies have led to the establishment and subsequent 
development of design guidelines and codes for fire safety in atrium buildings. 
j .~' r 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
1.0 Introduction. 
2.0 Fire Safety Problems in Atrium Buildings. 
3.0 Passive Fire and Smoke Control in Atrium Buildings. 
3.1 Fire Spread. 
3.2 Smoke Spread. 
3.3 Fire Resistant Linings 
4.0 Active Fire and Smoke Control in Atrium Buildings. 
4.1 Escape Routes and Evacuation. 
4.2 Smoke Extraction. 
4.3 Sprinklers, Drenchers and Deluge Systems. 
4.4 Pressurisation. 
5.0 Code Establishment. 
6.0 Incidents in Atria Buildings Case Summarizations. 
6.1 Atlanta Regency Hyatt Hotel. 
6.2 Recency Hyatt O'Hare Hotel, Chicago. 
6.3 International Monetary Fund Building, Washington D.C. 
7.0 Case Study Pan Pacific Hotel Auckland. 
7.1 Introduction 
7. 2 Standard Fire Protection Systems. 
7.3 Fire Detection. 
7.4 Emergency Evacuation System. 
7.5 Atrium Smoke Control System. 


























An atrium within a building is a large space which connects openings in floors, and which 
is wholly or partially enclosed at the top by a floor or roof. The essential difference between 
an atrium and a traditional inner courtyard or mall is that an atrium is greater than two 
storeys high, roofed over and smoke from a fire cannot readily escape to the outside 
atmosphere. 
Atrium buildings are a recent type of building structure, with many having been built 
overseas. They have become popular because they allow light into lower levels of buildings, 
creating an outside atmosphere which is protected from the extremes of climate. Therefore 
atriums can contribute to visual appeal and achieve economies in the use of heat and light as 
well as providing recreational space and an air of spaciousness. 
There are four main types of atrium and different fire safety problems and solutions may 
evolve from each,(fig 1.1): 
a) The fully open atrium is where the building has all its upper levels open to the 
atrium shaft. 
b) The partially open atrium is where the building has some of its lower levels open 
to the shaft and the remainder closed off. 
c) The closed atrium is where the atrium shaft is separated from the remainder of the 
building by ordinary (non-fire resistant) construction. The atrium floor may be 
used for recreation, restaurants or as a hotel lobby. 
d) The sterile tube atrium has an atrium shaft separated from the remainder of the 
building by fire resistant construction, with the atrium floor being used only for 
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(c) Closed (d) Sterile Tube 
Fig 1.1 Types of Atrium<6> 
2.0 FIRE SAFETY PROBLEMS IN ATRIUM BUILDINGS 
The existence of a large shaft extending through a number of floors is a departure from the 
traditional fire protection principal of compartmentalisation, for restricting the spread of 
smoke and fire. As far as fire is concerned, an atrium shaft is likened to a massive chimney. 
Standard requirements for protected shafts and compartmentalisation are intended to limit 
smoke and fire spread to the floor of origin, but fire occurring at the atrium floor level is 
likely to fill the atrium with smoke, and fire spread floor by floor is just as possible inside 
an atrium shaft as it is up the external facade of a building. 
Another major problem is egress through the atrium space. Visibility in a smoke logged 
atrium decreases rapidly and causes loss of orientation. Coupled with this is the tendency 
for people to escape from the building the same way they came in, because of their 
unfamiliarity with the exits. This causes delays in evacuation and prolongs their exposure 
to toxic smoke. \/", 
By far the most dangerous aspect of fire in atrium buildings is that of smoke control. It is 
well known that it is generally not fire, but smok~ which is the main cause of death. 
There are general principles or control measures which have to be applied to atrium buildings 
to establish fire safety effectiveness; 
If possible, smoke from a fire should be confined to the floor of origin by extraction 
on that floor. 
If smoke is allowed to spread into the atrium, it must be recognised that the smoke 
level will descend in the atrium for several floors unless high extraction rates are 
used. 
Sprinklers should be installed throughout to prevent the growth of fire. 
Smoke control must be by mechanical extraction as natural smoke venting is only 
effective for very low atrium spaces. 
No part of the escape path, in event of fire, should be in or open to the atrium, since 
it is likely that substantial smoke logging can occur within it. Open balconies, stairs 
and escalators in an atrium space are regarded as hazardous areas, unless special 
measures are taken. 
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In the fire protection design of atrium buildings, fire and smoke control systems are 
specifically designed with the above principles in mind. 
The design of fire control systems can be broken down into two main categories; 
1. Passive control systems, which are functional at all times, and are built-in features 
of the atrium building, and 
ii. Active control systems, which detect and fight fires directly when they occur. 
Active and passive smoke control systems are provided in the atrium space principally to 
increase the time available for evacuation, by preventing or delaying smoke and fire from 
spreading to the escape routes, and at the same time directing as much of it away to the 
outside of the building as possible. v 
3.0 PASSIVE FIRE AND SMOKE CONTROL IN ATRIUM BUILDINGS 
3.1 Fire Spread. 
In a conventional, compartmented building it is assumed that a fire will be contained within 
the floor of origin. It is evident for atrium buildings, that fire spread may occur up the sides 
of the atrium shaft, and that the problems confronted are similar to those for an external 
facade. Controlling the spread of fire in atrium building is a lesser problem than the hazard 
to life safety caused by spread of smoke. v 
3.2 Smoke Spread 
Fires can rapidly generate a large volume of hot smoke which will rise and spread outwards, 
and at the same time become diluted with many times its volume of cold air. A fire 
occurring in lower floors can fill much of the atrium volume with smoke in a time scale well 
within that needed for escape by the occupants of a tall building. 
It is unwise to rely on dilution of smoke by mixing within the atrium shaft. Cold air will 
be entrained by the hot gas as it rises in the atrium shaft, reducing its density and hence its 
buoyancy. At some height it will cease to rise by its own buoyancy but still spread 
sideways. This loss of buoyancy will tend to cause stagnation of the smoke mass which will 
be forced upwards by the smoke pressure below. Therefore there is an upper limit of about 
four storeys for the height within which natural venting from the top of the shaft will be / 
effective. 
It is also essential that a smoke reservoir be created at the top of the atrium shaft, otherwise 
as soon as the smoke reaches the top of the shaft it will begin to spread sideways into the 
uppermost floor space. This reservoir should be of the order of one storey in height. 
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Where the atrium is fully open, fire occurring on any floor will result in smoke spreading 
into the shaft. If the fire originates from the atrium floor it is likely that the rising smoke 
will bypass some of the lower floor levels and spread laterally into the upper floors. The 
partially open atrium shaft has an improved level of safety, for those occupants situated on 
the enclosed floors. 
Smoke stop doors within areas adjacent to the atrium will prevent smoke spread to and from 
adjacent areas. 
3. 3 Fire Resistant Linings. 
Generally the building materials used within the atrium and in adjacent areas have good fire 
resistant properties, and the level of fire resistance is usually in compliance with code 
requirements. 
If glazing is installed to permit viewing, and entry of light, the glass may shatter after being 
exposed for some time to hot gases on one side. This will permit the entry of smoke into 
the adjacent floor spaces. 
4.0 ACTIVE FIRE AND SMOKE CONTROL IN ATRIUM BUILDINGS 
4.1 Escape Routes and evacuation 
Building codes include provisions for safe escape routes for occupants within which they are 
protected from the effects of fire during their travel to a safe place. As described previously 
what happens when a fire occurs in an atrium building, it is evident that occupants will be 
at risk from rapid spread of smoke. 
Since they may be situated away from the fire source, it is essential that alarm systems are 
installed which provide occupants with an adequate escape time before smoke reaches them. 
This alarm must be audible, and in some cases visual, to all occupants. It has been found 
in overseas studies that sprinkler system alarms are too slow to ensure safe escape, so smoke 
detectors are specified in addition to these. 
Some atrium buildings have stairs and escalators situated within the atrium space, but these 
create problems because in the event of a fire in the atrium, smoke logging occurs, and 
occupants may become trapped while evacuating. Therefore in atrium buildings, it has been 
found necessary to provide two or more means of escape. Most codes require two separate 
protected stairwells remote from the atrium shaft. Open escape balconies can sometimes be 
found within the atrium space and are normally protected by the HVAC (Heating, Ventilation 
and Air Conditioning) systems, which provides pressurisation or uses fresh air deflectors to 




4.2 Smoke Extraction 
As previously mentioned natural venting at the top of an atrium shaft is ineffective in the 
extraction of smoke during a fire. Because of the large volume of smoke and hot gases, 
mechanical extraction is the preferred option for smoke removal. 
No smoke extraction system at the top of the shaft will perform as designed, unless adequate 
quantities of fresh inlet air are supplied at the base of the atrium shaft. It is recommended 
that the quantity should be equal to or greater than the design smoke extraction rate. 
With a fully mechanical system, care should be taken in locating the outlets from fresh air 
fans, because if an upward jet impinges on the base of a buoyant smoke layer, the resultant 
mixing could cause a disturbance of the smoke layer leading to downward mixing and poorer 
visibility at lower levels. Smoke extraction through the top of the atrium shaft is also 
affected by external wind flow. The roof geometry and surrounding land or cityscape may 
cause wind effects to oppose the escape of smoke. A solution to this is to divide the vent or 
fan size between leeward and windward sides of the smoke reservoir. One development is 
to install the full vent area on each side of the reservoir with direct wind sensors ensuring / 
that only downwind vents open in the event of fire. 
4.3 Sprinklers, Drenchers and Deluge Systems 
These active forms of fire protection are important in controlling the developing fire, keeping 
it small, and ensuring that the quantity of smoke generated is at a level where it can be 
handled by the extraction systems. 
All areas should be covered by sprinklers. Sprinklers installed at the top of the atrium shaft 
are ineffective because there is a delay in response time as the hot gases rise and accumulate 
in the atrium reservOir. On activation, water cooling the rising gases decreases smoke ·./ 
buoyancy.· 
On the atrium floor level, sprinkJers can be located around the perimeter, but are only 
effective against fire directly below them. 
For fire out of range of the perimeter sprinklers, deluge systems or sprinklers with long 
throw heads, can be installed around the lower floor levels, these discharge large volumes ./ 
of water. 
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Wherever a floor is open to the atrium shaft, there is a danger of a slow response for 
sprinkler heads because of the time it may take to accumulate enough hot gas to activate 
them. Smoke baffles should be installed to trap smoke and immerse the heads so that they 
will activate sooner in the event of tire. Smoke baffles on the other hand may encourage 
lateral spread of smoke. (Fig 4. 1) 
' ' \_,.._.;~. 
Balustrade 900mm h1gh 
(see code clause 7.4) 
Smoke baffle 400mm 
deep (see code clauses 
2 & 7 5) 
Beam used in lieu of smoke 
baHie (see code clause 7 5) 
Fig 4.1 Detail of Smoke Baffle or Floor Edge at Atrium Shaft. <6> 
Another form of sprinkler which can be installed is the external wall drencher which is 
generally used to protect glazing between floors in the event of fire, by directing spray upon 
the glazed surface. 
4. 4 Pressurisation 
Pressurisation of shafts and escape routes are important smoke control measures. The 
pressurisation system uses the building's HVAC system and maintains higher pressures in 
safe areas like balconies and protected exit ways so that air flow is always directed outwards. 
This prevents smoke from collecting in these areas and hindering evacuation. 
When the fire occurs, fresh air flows into balconies and the atrium shaft, which become 
pressurised. Smoke flowing from the fire floor is prevented from encroachment onto the 
other floors. 
Using pressurisation with selective controls placed on air handling equipment, in fire mode, 
the fire floor can be placed on extract (to the exterior) and the remainder of the floor is 
pressurised avoiding filling the atrium. 
7 
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5.0 CODE ESTABLISHMENT 
As atrium buildings are a fairly recent form of structure in New Zealand, there have been 
no previous codes or standards on which to base fire protection requirements, except for the 
conventional building codes. They also present unique problems, and there has been a need 
for the establishment of codes and fire prevention standards. 
New Zealand guidelines for the design and standards of performance of fire safety features 
in atrium buildings are set out in NZS4238: 1991, "Code of Practice for Fire Safety m 
Atrium Buildings". The key aim being public safety. 
Assessments need to be made and various factors have to be considered in the design of 
atrium structures; 
The activities which will take place in the atrium. 
Justification for the selection of smoke control and extract systems. 
Adequacy and efficiency of the smoke extraction system chosen. 
The duration for which the smoke control system will be able to keep the building 
occupied with all exit signs visible. 
The ventilation in the atrium space and the efficiency of the fresh air inlets and smoke 
extraction outlets in maintaining the required air circulation in the shaft. 
The adequacy of evacuation routes and strategies for the early evacuation of 
occupants. 
The reliabilitY of smoke and thermal detection devices ·used. 
During the planning and design stage, agreement must be reached between the engineer and 
the approving authority, and fire service, as to the suitability of the proposed smoke control 
systems to be used in the building. 
In some cases smoke testing is carried out in the atrium to determine smoke extraction 
system effectiveness. Smoke testing is a method of assessing the effectiveness of the smoke 
control system. Commercially available chemical smoke in heated (hot), or unheated (cold) 
forms are used. 
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There are two main phases involved. The first is the testing of individual components in the 
smoke control system to ensure that they perform to specification. This includes smoke 
detector and alarm responses, pressurisation systems, automatic door closers and trigger 
mechanisms for emergency power supplies from back up diesel generators. The second 
phase is a full simulation of the worst possible fire in the atrium space to gauge the 
effectiveness of all the components worldng together. Response times of detectors, efficiency 
of the smoke extractors, pressurisation and duration for which exit signs remain visible are 
all monitored. 
Reproduction of smoke that is cold, non toxic, chemically inert and clean is difficult in the 
quantities required to simulate a real fire. Only when a real fire occurs can the effectiveness 
of any system be evaluated. 
It should be emphasised that atrium buildings throw up problems which are different for 
every case. Every building design must be analyzed in its own right, and any attempt to 
apply a generalised building code may not necessarily produce a safe building. 
6.0 INCIDENTS IN A TRIA BIDLDINGS: CASE SUMMARIZATIONS 
As atria buildings are a fairly new form of structure, there have been few documented fire 
incidents worldwide. A study of the few which have occurred have shown that any smoke 
control system must be designed to cater for very large volumes of smoke. 
6.1 Atlanta Regency Hyatt Hotel 
~ , I H· 
This was a small incident where burning curtains on an upper gallery in the atrium were 
extinguished by the fire brigade without any smoke logging or evacuation. Sprinklers have 
dealt with undeveloped fires in hotel rooms also without problems . 
. 'I 
6.2 Regency Hyatt O'Hare Hotel, Chicago l'--""~ 
The Regency Hyatt O'Hare Hotel is an atrium structure where four bedroom towers open up 
onto the atrium which contain a lift and off which shops, a restaurant and nightclub open to 
the bottom level. 
This was a major fire which was started deliberately in the nightclub at lobby level, below 
one side of the bedroom courts. The club was unoccupied and a large fire developed as 
sprinklers were not installed in the area. The atrium was filled with smoke down to bedroom 
level, directly above the lobby, and the automatic extract system was inoperative as it had 
been disconnected for maintenance. Neither the recirculation based system nor summertime 
cross-ventilation system under the skylight were operational. 
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There were protected stairs in the core of the bedroom towers, but some guests got into 
difficulty by trying to reach the atrium lifts. Guests were all evacuated and no one was hurt 
although there was extensive smoke logging. v' 
-~ 
6.3 International Monetary Fund Building, Washington D.C. rt\ . 
This is a 13 storey atrium office building with its floor space almost entirely subdivided into 
cellular offices with glass walls to the atrium. A small ftre broke out in one 14m office on 
the 1Oth floor one evening and broke a window to the atrium, filling it with smoke. Smoke 
detectors operated and released six spring loaded panels in the roof glazing to vent the 
smoke. Only two of these panels opened due to corroded springs or slides and the remaining 
four were opened manually at a later stage. 
Smoke quickly filled the 30x43m2 atrium space and spread downwards reaching the floor of 
the atrium. The atrium HV AC system which included smoke purging facilities had been 
switched off and the fire service did not know how to operate it in the building engineer's 
absence. Sprinklers under the plastic glazed roof never reached operating temperature, but 
even if they had they would only have cooled and mixed the smoke in the atrium. The 
smoke was finally cleared using portable smoke ejection fans placed on the atrium floor, as 
all venting proved ineffective. 
The above three incidents highlight three main features; 
Small fires in atrium buildings will generate very large quantities of smoke. 
Natural venting proves inefficient in tall atrium buildings, as the smoke is cool and 
loses buoyancy. 
Smoke control should be by mechanical extraction and must be operational at all 
times. 
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7.0 CASE STUDY OF THE PAN PACIFIC HOTEL AUCKLAND 
7.1 Introduction 
The Pan Pacific Hotel is the first fully open atrium building m New Zealand and was 
originally designed as a closed atrium structure. 
The problems associated with atrium buildings have been outlined in previous parts of this 
report, and it is hoped that this case study outlines the way in which these obstacles were 
overcome. 
The Pan Pacific Hotel is situated opposite the Aotea Centre in downtown Auckland and is 
separated in to buildings, the hotel and car park. The car park consists of 12 levels of car 
parking, a banquet hall, private dinning areas and associated kitchen, with a tennis court on 
the roof. The hotel is a fourteen level V shaped building with eleven floors of 
accommodation, two levels of restaurants, bars, concierge, etc and one level of offices, staff 
facilities and plant rooms. 
During construction, ideas incorporated into the design had to get council and fire service 
permission, many of these were tested during full scale smoke tests carried out while the 
building was under construction. These involved producing a mock up of a corridor section 
and igniting smoke bombs while different configurations of linear deflectors,handrails, fans 
and air quantises were trailed. Final configurations had to get council and fire service 
permission before installation could begin and further conditions were imposed that a full 
scale smoke test be carried out prior to hotel opening. 
The main concern and reason for these tests was clogging up of the corridors with smoke 




7. 2 Standard Fire protection Systems. 
The first line of defence for fire is the sprinkler, nser fire hose reel and fire resisting 
construction employed throughout. 
Most measures taken in this respect don't differ from that found in normal high rise 
construction. Sprinklers are installed in all rooms, corridors, concealed spaces, as well as 
in the hollow roof beams and long throw sprinklers surround the level 3 atrium perimeter 
Internal division between floors was treated as for external floor division, requiring the 
handrail to made into a (solid) fire resisting wall instead of the glass one originally specified. 
Doors opening on to the atrium corridors were required to have a 2 hour FRR (fire resistance 
rating) together with walls separating the atrium (fig 7.1) from other areas. 
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Fire hose reels are installed on every floor open to the atrium, these are situated to cover all 
corridors within the atrium area. Operation of these is monitored in the security room and 
water is supplied by one of two pumps situated in the main plant room. (fig 7. 2) 
Dry risers are installed in all egress stairs servicing the atrium with connection points situated 
adjacent the pump house mimic panel and on Vincent St.(fig 7.2) 
Egress Stair 2 





Egress Stair 3 
& Dry Riser 
Pumphouse, Mimic Panel 
Riser inlet 





Fig 7.2 Position of Egress Stairs,Fire hose reel,and Dry Risers Egress Stair 1 
& Dry Riser 
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7. 3 Fire Detection 
There is a two fold fire detection system installed in the Pan Pacific Hotel, firstly infra red 
detectors, there are two of these installed angled at 45o from level 3 into the Atrium foyer 
these are designed to detect heat haze, as a result little combustible material is allowed in the 
atrium floor area. 
The second detection system is for smoke, there is a series of seven pairs of linear detectors 
that cross the atrium at level four. These are an interrupted beam type detector which detect 
smoke rising in the atrium. 
On activation of one of the detectors either infra red or linear the security room is informed 
that a detector has been activated, security is then given a limited time (16 minutes) to 
determine the problem and remedy the fault. Failure to remedy the problem within the time 
limit will result in activation of the emergency evacuation system 
Activation of both systems simultaneously will result in the emergency evacuation system 
being activated. 
7.4 Emergency Evacuation System 
Activation of the emergency evacuation system may be by the smoke, flame detection 
system, sprinkler system operation by means of a flow switch on the sprinkler pumps or 
manual activation in the security room. On activation of this system sirens sound in the 
public areas, while in hotel rooms televisions are switched on via an infra red remote control 
placed in the ceiling cornice. An emergency evacuation message is played on the television 
and through a loud speaker situated in the bathroom. This is designed to wake up any 
occupants that may be sleeping. 
Activation of the emergency evacuation system will result in an automatic call to the Fire 
Service and the emergency evacuation system will continue until the Fire service has given 
the all clear. 
On activation of the emergency evacuation system the atrium smoke control system comes 
into operation. 
14 
7.5 Atrium Smoke Control System. 
Activation of the emergency evacuation system results in the automatic operation of the 
atrium smoke control system. This begins a series of measures that stop smoke entering the 
atrium, extracts any smoke that does enter the atrium, and prevents smoke that may enter the 
atrium from entering corridors further up the building. 
Lobby level smoke extraction system. 
On activation of the atrium smoke control system a smoke extraction system operates on 
lobby level. In case of a fire this is to prevent smoke from other areas detached of the 
atrium entering the atrium. This involves smoke flaps surrounding the atrium dropping by 
means of hydraulics revealing ducting connected to a smoke extraction system. This IS 
designed to extract smoke flowing along the ceiling and prevent it entering the atrium. 
Smoke Extract Fans 
In normal use these control build up of heat in the upper atrium; while .under emergency 
evacuation system conditions these fans "wind up" to extract 100 m3/s through fans situated 
at each end of the five hollow beams that support the roof glazing. This results in an air 
change in the atrium every ten minutes. These are designed to keep the atrium clear of 
smoke in the event of fire. 
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Corridor Air Curtain. 
Every pair of rooms is serviced by a utilities duct which in normal use is pressurized by a 
fan at the top of each duct providing fresh air to corridors via a scoop at each of the 
accommodation levels controlling heat build up . Under atrium smoke control system use, 
the fans operate at full speed and air from linear deflectors surrounding the atrium form an 
air curtain which provides fresh air and stops smoke from entering the corridor by deflecting 
air onto the handrail which is shaped to provide a swirling action into the corridor and deflect 
smoke into the atrium space, away from the corridor. (fig 7.3) 
This handrail configuration is also useful in preventing objects falling into the atrium. 
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Fig 7.3 Linear Deflector Handrail Detail 
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7.6 Auxiliary Systems. 
On operation of the emergency evacuation system, the long throw sprinklers surrounding the 
atrium at Level 3 operate. These are a deluge system and are intended to cover the.entire 
open atrium area. 
On the underside of the hollow roof beams normal sprinklers with a temperature rating of 
about lOOoc are installed, these are to cool smoke and stop overheating of the fans, in the 
event of a large fire. 
Smoke stop doors on the accommodation levels separating the atrium from other areas are 
held open by magnetic clamps and are released on activation of the emergency evacuation 
system. 
Opening of utility ducts for maintenance activates an alarm in the security room, as operation 
of the emergency evacuation system while a duct was open would cause loss of integrity of 
the system. 
Supply air fans operate to replenish air being extracted by the atrium smoke extract fans. 
These discharge onto level 1 so as not to disrupt the smoke flaps on the level below. 
Every component of the emergency evacuation system is monitored by computer in the 
security room which is manned 24 hours with any unusual operation sending an alarm. 




From the consideration of fire safety in atrium buildings, it is possible to make the following 
conclusions; 
An atrium is an acceptable way of creating a pleasant internal environment in a 
building, and protecting it from the extremes of climate. 
There is a need to pay added attention to life safety during a fire than for a normal 
compartmented building. 
The first consideration when designing an atrium building is the provision of adequate 
means of escape to a place of safety. Keeping egress corridors clear of smoke. 
As smoke control is a major concern, smoke detectors are essential for providing 
adequate early warning of smoke and for actuating the smoke extraction system. 
Mechanical smoke extraction systems are essential and must be operational at all 
times. 
The installation of automatic sprinklers is an essential means of controlling fire 
growth, and to ensure that the quantity of smoke is capable of being handled by the 
smoke extraction system. 
Calculation for the design of a smoke extraction system should take into account the 
behaviour of hot buoyant gases. 
Atrium is to be compartmentalised from other areas of the building, to stop smoke 
from entering other areas of the building from the atrium, or to keep smoke out of 
the atrium. 
Fire resistant construction to be used to keep fire growth minimised 
Codes and guidelines have been established for fire protection in atrium buildings, but 
safety evaluation and smoke testing should be carried out on structures before 
comm1sswmng. 
Therefore for a new form of structure such as atrium buildings, we find that new forms of 
fire and smoke control have been developed, and design guidelines and codes established, 
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